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Abstract:  This paper seeks to retest the oligopolistic cooperation hypothesis of market 
structure from the Centralized Private Sector Planning literature, using 2010 data on 
corporate board membership and recent advances in social network analysis.  Centrality 
measures are calculated based upon the corporate governance network emerging from 
common board membership on Fortune 100 firms.  The findings herein suggest that not 
only does oligopolistic cooperation continue to characterize the US economy, but 
directors from the finance and insurance sector occupy a significantly more central role in 
the planning process than those of other industries.  (91 words) 
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It has long been the province of institutional economics to address the question:  
what is the nature of the firm in the context of evolutionary change?  One contribution 
towards addressing this issue remains the recognition that firms operate not as isolated 
producers working to meet the demands of the market, but rather operate in concert to the 
needs of the “machine process” (Veblen, 1904).  As the machine process grows in scope 
and complexity it eclipses the market as a social provisioning process. Pecuniary interests 
vested in the integrated industrial system demand a minimal degree of certainty regarding 
the validation of financial interests, which necessitates an institutional framework capable 
of planning for such contingency.  We know this institution as the modern corporation. 
 This paper focuses on the manner in which corporations coordinate efforts for 
their mutual benefit.  The notion of Centralized Private Sector Planning (CPSP) emerges 
in the institutional economics literature to explain the “opaque fact” that the modern 
industrial production system constitutes a network of interlocking institutional 
arrangements, whereby its constituent elements play some part in the production of 
financial profits for the whole (Munkirs, 1985; Munkirs and Knoedler, 1987).  This paper 
seeks to reexamine one implication of the CPSP literature: that the economy can best be 
described as a system of oligopolistic cooperation (Munkirs and Sturgeon, 1985).   
While an analysis of all categories of institutional interlocks presented in the 
CPSP literature is beyond the scope of this paper, it shall be argued that board of director 
interlocks alone provide sufficient evidence that oligopolistic cooperation constitutes the 
essential structure of the economy today.  Moreover, the centrality of financial and 
insurance entities continues to exert a considerable degree of influence over the planning 
process amongst America’s largest corporations.  To establish the empirical basis for the 
assertions listed above, this paper employs recent methodological advances in the area of 
social network analysis to construct the Fortune 100 corporate governance network.  The 
results provide some quantitative measure of power and influence vested in the corporate 
elite. 
 
Methodology and Results 
 Social network analysis (SNA) provides a host of techniques that allow the 
researcher to investigate the institutional complexity involved in a variety of systems2.  
SNA rejects reductionist approaches that focus in the individual, suggesting instead the 
ties between individuals (nodes) serve as the fundamental unit of analysis.  Furthermore, 
the approach recognizes that complex networks of connections give rise to emergent 
structures, which then become the basis for analysis.  Given a set of nodes3 N one may 
formalize the connections between each element of N with an adjacency matrix X.  The 
resulting NxN matrix contains null values along its principal diagonal, and a binary value 
indicating whether a tie between the ith and jth element of N exists along its off 
diagonals.  Once populated, the adjacency matrix allows the researcher to calculate a 
number of measures for network centrality4.  The centrality of a given node in terms of 
the network may be used to make inference regarding its relative importance, influence, 
status or prestige (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).  A more formal definition for centrality, 
as well as the measures employed in this study, shall be offered below.  For now the task 
remains to introduce the manner in which this study constructs the network of 
interlocking corporate directorates.   
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 This paper focuses on the Fortune 100 list of American corporations for 2010 as 
well as each firm’s respective board of directors (BOD)5.  Taking the set of corporations 
and board members together as our list of nodes allows us to examine which board 
members provide a link between firms through common BOD membership.  Three 
networks emerge from the data that are of interest to this paper.  First, the total set of 
directors and corporations constitutes a network wherein the largest corporations in 
America are connected indirectly through common board members.  In total, there are 
1129 nodes (directors plus firms) with 1179 ties linking them together.  Since the ties are 
greater then nodes, we observe that some directors serve on more than one board.  For 
example, Richard Myers sits on the boards of both United Technologies and Northrup 
Grumman. While this network is interesting insofar as one may examine which directors 
serve as connections between different corporate boards, measures of centrality lose 
meaning since each corporation will have a degree centrality measure equal to the 
number of directors on its board.  We are more interested in the indirect connections 
implied by interlocking directorates, which will give us some sense of the centrality of 
each Fortune 100 firm. 
 The second network of interest emerges as we limit our set of nodes to the list of 
Fortune 100 firms, then cross-tabulate each element of the set according to common 
board membership.  Excluding firms for which no common membership exists with 
another corporate board results in 82 firms defining a square matrix, populated with the 
number of direct BOD interlocks in off-diagonal cells6.  A graphical representation of the 
results in Appendix 1 is shown in Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1:  Network of Fortune 100 firms joined by common membership on boards of directors 
(excluding isolates).  Nodes weighted by # of direct interlocks. 
 
Source:  Boards gleaned from Reuters for public companies, while 2010 annual reports were used for private companies.  
 
A cursory glance at this network illustrates a few interesting characteristics.  First, we 
note the distribution of degree centrality – the number of direct BOD interlocks between 
firms – is asymmetric.  That is, some firms are more connected than others.  In fact, only 
82% of Fortune’s 2010 list of the largest American corporations are connected to at least 
one other corporation.  The following table summarizes the distribution of degree 
centrality amongst firms shown in Figure 1: 
 
Table 1:  Frequency distribution of degree centrality for firms in Figure 1 
Degree Range Frequency Cumulative % 
0-2 23 28.05% 
2-4 20 52.44% 
4-6 24 81.71% 
6-8 12 96.34% 
8-10 1 97.56% 
10-12 2 100.00% 
Source:  Based upon centrality measures calculated in Gephi 
It is clear from the table shown above that most of the firms are connected to six 
or less other firms and only 18% have direct BOD interlocks with more than six.  These 
highly connected companies include the likes of J.P Morgan Chase, GE, Goldman Sachs, 
AIG, and IBM, to name a few.  In other words, the corporations that typically register in 
our minds as powerful or influential are central to the network when measured in terms of 
direct BOD interlocks.  However, degree centrality alone does not provide us with 
enough information to determine how important or influential corporations are within the 
totality of the network.  For instance, we may be interested in the relationship between 
two corporations that are indirectly connected – e.g. J.P. Morgan Chase is one degree 
removed from Citigroup via common directors on the board of Comcast.  From the 
perspective of the network, interaction between these two firms depends, in part, on 
Comcast.   
The SNA literature defines the sort of network role implied in the Comcast 
example as “betweenness centrality” (BC) (Anthonisse, 1971; Freeman, 1977; Pitts, 
1979).  More recently, Wasserman and Faust (1994, pp. 189-190) emphasize Shaw’s 
(1954) recognition that nodes serving as bridges between the interaction of other nodes, 
assume higher degrees of “stress,” thus we attribute importance to such position through 
an index of BC7.  A node’s “betweenness” is the sum of probabilities that it will lie on the 
shortest path between any two nodes in the network.  These probabilities are then 
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normalized to range between 0 and 1.  Calculating BC measures for each of our 82 firms 
allows us to scale each node and identify which firms assume more of this new measure 
of centrality. 
Figure 2: Network identified in Figure 1where nodes are weighted by betweenness centrality. 
 
Source: See Figure 1 
 
BC measures range from 0 to .1180, with a mean and median of .0285 and .0236 
respectively.  As with degree centrality, the distribution of BC scores are skewed towards 
the upper-tail of the distribution, suggesting that a minority of firms are well positioned 
to influence the interaction between two other firms that otherwise lack common ties.  An 
examination of Figure 2 yields the observation that membership among the elite subset of 
high BC firms includes many financial or insurance firms.  Based upon the role suggested 
in the CPSP literature for the CPC (Munkirs, 1985) we would expect banks and insurance 
companies to be central in this regard.  Of the 82 firms that comprise this network, 16 
represent the finance and insurance (FI) sector8.  On average, FI firms possess a BC 
measure of .0350 which is statistically different than the unrestricted set average of .0285 
at all levels of significance.  These results suggest that banks and insurance companies 
are centrally positioned, through interlocking BODs, to affect the overall corporate 
governance of America’s largest companies.   
Thus far our discussion has considered networks that emerge from connections 
between directors and firms.  A third and final network of interest arises from the implicit 
ties between directors that serve on common boards.  In similar fashion to the approach 
used to develop the network of interlocking firms described above, we arrange our set of 
nodes to include only the 1029 directors.  The corresponding adjacency matrix will also 
be square and contain an array of binary values indicating whether a tie exists between 
two directors based upon co-membership on Fortune 100 boards9.  This approach has the 
advantage of allowing us to examine the structure of the corporate governance 
community, by drawing direct connections between those that sit face-to-face in board 
meetings. 
Figure 3 below offers a visual overview of the implicit community of Fortune 100 
corporate directors.  For the sake of clarity, isolate groups of directors have been 
excluded.  Given an average degree centrality measure of 14 as well as the relatively 
large number of directors, it is not surprising that all 787 directors are connected by a 
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reproduce these results. 
total of 5395 individual links.  To illustrate visually the distribution of FI vs. non-FI 
directors, we color each node dichromatically:  grey for FI directors, white otherwise.   
Figure 3:  Network of directors affiliated by common board members.  Nodes weighted by degree 
centrality (n=787, edges = 5395).  To zoom in at high resolution this image may be viewed at:  
http://zoom.it/mTYR 
 
Source:  See Figure 1 
 The distribution of centrality measures for the affiliation network of corporate 
directors is summarized below: 
Table 2:  Summary statistics for affiliation network of Fortune 100 board members.  * indicates that 
F/I directors are significantly different than all directors in terms of mean centrality. 
Nodes Stats Degree BC 
All Directors Mean 13.71029 0.004216 
Median 12 0 
Skewness 2.051343 3.654606 
SD 5.791978 0.012239 
Finance / 
Insurance 
Directors 
Mean 16.61353* 0.008632* 
Median 13 0 
Skewness 1.115481 2.152599 
 
Overall the centrality of directors follows an asymmetric distribution, with a 
minority of directors possessing high degrees of centrality with respect to the rest of the 
group.  Similar to the network of firms shown in Figure 1, a large proportion of these 
central directors sit on the nation’s largest financial / insurance firms.  As shown in Table 
2 directors from the FI sector are more central –both in terms of degree and BC- on 
average.  While the FI sector represents only 26% of all directors in the network, their 
directors are 15% more likely to have a higher than average degree of connectedness 
when compared to the group as a whole.  Similarly, these data suggests that FI directors 
are 11% more likely to have a higher than average BC measure. 
 To further emphasize the importance of the banking and insurance industry with 
regard to the overall structure of the network let us consider the ego network of one 
director in particular:  William H. Gray, III.  Briefly defined, an ego network captures the 
connection any one individual may have as a subset of the entire network.  For networks 
as large and as connected as that depicted in Figure 3 it quickly becomes difficult to tease 
out which nodes serves as indirect connections for any one subject.  An ego network 
allows us to specify the degree of separation – say two – and create a new network with 
only those links that satisfy the condition.  This allows us to quickly identify the 
characteristics of any particular element.  Figure 4 shows the ego network for Mr. Gray to 
the extent that we capture not only his direct ties – those that sit on common boards with 
him –but also the indirect ties that result from Gray’s board colleagues’ other governing 
obligations.   
 Gray serves on four Fortune 100 boards:  JP Morgan Chase, Pfizer, Prudential 
Financial, and Dell.  The members of these boards are circled and enumerated in Figure 4 
as they are listed above.  Given the direct ties of the members on these four boards, Gray 
extends his professional network to a total of 186 corporate directors.  In other words, 
Gray is either directly or indirectly connected to 24% of all other corporate elites 
governing America’s 100 largest corporations.  If it were the case that Gray is not unique 
in this regard, one may observe that a very small minority could potentially have a rather 
large impact on the administration of the commanding heights of our economy.   
Whither Oligopolistic Cooperation? 
 
 While this study excludes most of the institutional arrangements – e.g. stocks, 
bonds, trustees and transfer agents, etc. – employed in the CPSP literature, the high level 
of BOD interconnectedness offers substantial evidence that oligopolistic cooperation 
continues to describe the structure of the modern economy.  Extending this analysis to 
include such institutional ties as stock control, bond issues, balance sheet obligations 
between firms, and political contributions, only increases the complexity and structural 
interdependence of today’s machine process.  Moreover, the decision to exclude 18 of the 
Fortune 100 firms from the analysis above did not result from the recognition that they 
represent some bastion of free-market independence. Rather, their ties to the network 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 4:  Ego network for William H. Gray, III  extended to 2 degrees of separation.  To zoom in at high 
resolution this image may be viewed at: http://zoom.it/sFdL 
 
 
    
are not realized at the depth of Fortune 100 directors.  Isolate periphery Fortune 50 firms 
find their links as directors from the Fortune 100 firms are added, and so with the 
relationship between Fortune 100 and Fortune 200 directors.  In essence, establishing the 
1
2
3
4
true nature of industrial concatenation is a recursive problem beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
Fortunately, it is unnecessary to perform such a task to simply retest the notion 
that corporations operating in an oligopolistically cooperative environment exhibit a high 
degree of administrative interdependence.  The structural reality of the corporate 
governance community in 2010, demands that William H. Gray, Samuel Nunn, and 
Richard Myers cooperate. “For these members to act as if these intradependencies did not 
exist would be both logically and practically indicative of irrational tendencies” (Munkirs 
and Sturgeon, 1985)10. 
 The methods employed in the preceding analysis are not new to institutional 
economics.  Hayden’s application of graph theory to the social fabric matrix approach 
makes explicit the promise of network analysis in illustrating the key structural aspects of 
the social provisioning process (Hayden, 1982a; Hayden, 1982b; Hayden, 1986; Hayden 
and Stephenson, 1995).  More recently, Hayden et al (2002) employs recent advances in 
the SNA literature that takes centrality as a measure of power to identify networks of 
corporate dominance.  Yet as Hayden (2002, pg. 695) argues, there remains much work 
in the area of network analysis on corporate power blocs, given its ability to illuminate 
vested interests at work and the necessity for democratic, institutional adjustment. 
Conclusion 
 This paper has presented recent evidence in support of the oligopolistic 
cooperation view of market structure.  Recent advances in social network analysis 
methods were employed to construct the network of Fortune 100 interlocking boards of 
directors and develop two indices for network centrality:  degree and betweenness.  These 
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 Gray, Nunn and Myers are at most indirectly related through the boards of:  Prudential Financial, Chevron, Northrup-
Grumman and Dell. 
results illustrate the extent of administrative interdependence that characterizes the so 
called commanding heights of the economy.  It has been demonstrated that the pecuniary 
employments remain central to planning process of the modern production system, and 
hint towards further evolution in the same direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 1:  Adjacency Matrix for 82 Overlapping BOD of Fortune 100 
  
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
1
1
1
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
3
1
1
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
5
1
1
1
1
1
1
6
1
1
1
7
1
1
8
1
1
1
1
9
1
10
2
1
2
1
1
1
11
1
1
1
12
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
13
1
1
14
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
15
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
16
1
1
17
1
1
1
2
1
18
2
1
1
1
19
1
1
20
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
21
3
1
1
22
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
23
1
1
1
24
1
1
1
1
1
1
25
1
1
1
1
1
1
26
1
27
1
1
1
1
1
28
1
29
1
1
2
1
1
1
30
1
1
1
31
1
32
1
1
1
1
1
33
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
34
1
1
1
1
35
1
1
1
1
1
1
36
1
37
1
1
38
1
1
1
1
39
1
1
1
40
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
41
1
42
1
1
1
1
43
1
1
44
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
45
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
46
1
1
1
1
47
1
1
48
1
1
1
1
1
49
1
1
1
50
1
51
1
2
52
1
1
1
1
1
53
1
2
54
1
55
1
1
1
1
1
56
1
1
1
1
1
57
1
1
1
1
58
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
59
1
60
1
1
1
1
61
1
1
1
1
62
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
63
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
64
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
65
1
1
1
66
1
67
1
1
1
1
1
68
1
1
69
1
1
70
1
1
1
1
1
2
71
1
72
1
1
1
73
1
1
1
74
1
1
2
1
1
1
75
1
76
1
1
1
1
1
1
77
1
78
1
1
1
1
1
79
1
1
1
2
80
1
1
1
1
81
1
1
82
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
To
ta
ls
6
3
6
7
6
3
2
4
2
8
3
11
1
8
7
2
6
5
3
7
4
7
4
5
6
1
5
2
7
3
1
5
8
5
7
1
2
6
3
7
1
5
2
13
7
4
2
5
3
1
2
5
2
1
5
4
3
6
1
4
5
9
7
8
3
1
7
2
2
7
1
3
3
5
1
6
1
5
5
4
2
9
Appendix 1 Continued (adjacency matrix key) 
Id Firm Name Id Firm Name 
1 Abbott Laboratories 49 Kroger 
2 Aetna 50 Lockheed Martin 
3 Allstate 51 Lowe's 
4 American Express 52 Marathon Oil 
5 AIG 53 McKesson 
6 Apple 54 Medco Health Solutions 
7 ADM 55 Merck 
8 AT&T 56 MetLife 
9 Bank of America Corp. 57 Microsoft 
10 Berkshire Hathaway 58 Morgan Stanley 
11 Best Buy 59 News Corp. 
12 Boeing 60 Northrop Grumman 
13 Cardinal Health 61 PepsiCo 
14 Caterpillar 62 Pfizer 
15 Chevron 63 Procter & Gamble 
16 Cisco Systems 64 Prudential Financial 
17 Citigroup 65 Rite Aid 
18 Coca-Cola 66 Safeway 
19 Comcast 67 Sprint Nextel 
20 ConocoPhillips 68 Supervalu 
21 Costco Wholesale 69 Sysco 
22 Dell 70 Target 
23 Delta Air Lines 71 TIAA-CREF 
24 Dow Chemical 72 Time Warner 
25 DuPont 73 Travelers Cos. 
26 Express Scripts 74 United Parcel Service 
27 Exxon Mobil 75 UnitedHealth Group 
28 Fannie Mae 76 United Technologies 
29 FedEx 77 Valero Energy 
30 Ford Motor 78 Verizon Communications 
31 Freddie Mac 79 Wal-Mart Stores 
32 General Dynamics 80 Walt Disney 
33 General Electric 81 WellPoint 
34 General Motors 82 Wells Fargo 
35 Goldman Sachs Group 
36 Hartford Financial Services 
37 Hess 
38 Hewlett-Packard 
39 Home Depot 
40 Honeywell International 
41 Humana 
42 Intel 
43 International Assets Holding 
44 IBM 
45 J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. 
46 Johnson & Johnson 
47 Johnson Controls 
48 Kraft Foods 
  
Appendix 2:  Centrality Measures 
 
Wasserman and Faust (1994) define the centrality measures used in the preceding analysis as follows: 
 
 
Degree Centrality: 
 
Let CD(ni) define an index of actor-level degree centrality, Nn ∈∀ ; where N ={n1, n2, n3, …, ng }. 
Further define X as the sociomatrix (or adjacency matrix) for the relation between g nodes in N, such that each  
element of X expresses the value of the tie between the ith and jth element of N as xij.  Then, CD(ni) = ∑
j
ijx  
 
Betweenness Centrality: 
 
Let CB(ni) define an index of actor-level betweenness centrality, Nn ∈∀ ; where N ={n1, n2, n3, …, ng }. 
Let gjk be the number of ties between the jth and kth actor.  If all ties are equally likely to be chosen as the path 
between the jth and kth actor, then the probability that any given path will be chosen is simply 1/gjk.  Further, let 
gjk(ni) define the number of paths on which a given ith element of N serves as intermediary between the jth and 
kth actor.  Then, ∑
<
=
kj
jkijkiB gngnC /)()( .  Alternatively to normalize the index between 0 and 1 we express: 
]2/)2)(1/[()()(' −−= ggnCnC iBiB  
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